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Storytelling and Forgetfulness
Years ago, I began to run into the claim that we are all storytellers.¹ Storytelling was
evidently a primal communal function for humanity. I was assured that we have been
telling each other stories since the beginning of time. I felt a churlish resistance to
these proclamations, possibly because one might decide that being human does
not mean one should subscribe, without discomfiture, to everything the human
race is collectively doing at any given point. Storytelling should not be guaranteed
an aura simply because humans have been at it from the beginning of history. Of
course, part of my unease emanated from the fact that the ‘beginning of history’ is
even more of a wishful invention than the ‘end of history’ is. It occurs to me that
we probably began to hear ‘we are all storytellers,’ as an utterance, from the late
1980s and early 90s onwards. From the moment one first heard this utterance, one
was told it had been made from the beginning of time. As with various things that
happened in the age of globalization, radical shifts in our understanding (of
value, for instance) quickly acquired an immemorial air. So, for example, it became
increasingly difficult to conceive of a period in history that valued things differently
from the way the free market does. Middle-class ideology may have concerned itself
with appropriating the universal; the ‘now’ of the free market appears to have been
more preoccupied with recruiting eternity. As a result, the popular-culture term ‘all
time’ gained a new meaning with globalization; like the assertion ‘We have always
been storytellers,’ ‘all-time’ lists and ‘all-time greats’ often go back over periods,
and are applied to categories (like rock guitarists), that are actually thirty years old.
The disciplinary shifts in the humanities privileging ‘storytelling’ are too numer-
ous to go into here: I will only give one example. A historian recently told me that she
asks her students to liberate themselves from the constraints of their pedagogy by
thinking of the novel and behaving like ‘storytellers.’ As I said to her, this interpre-
tation of the novel of course inadvertently makes imaginative writing, especially fic-
tion, synonymous with storytelling: it is as if looking outside the bounds of scholarly
work towards fiction or imaginative prose as a model for loosening constraints must
privilege narrative, rather than other aspects of fiction, as being constitutive of the
liberations of imaginative writing.
A surfeit of ‘We are all storytellers’ made me realize that this was not really a
primary utterance at all. The primary utterance, if there must be one, is praise or ac-
knowledgement of what makes stories and other things possible: existence; life. By
‘life’ I mean not what narrative is ‘about,’ but what lies on narrative’s periphery.
What the earliest texts seem to do is to attempt to find a language with which to
 This article was first published in the Los Angeles Review of Books (September 20, 2019). See here
for the online version: https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/storytelling-and-forgetfulness/.
OpenAccess. © 2021 Amit Chaudhuri, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110688719-004
both come to terms with and acknowledge – even celebrate – the contingency of the
fact of existence. The story, with the human or anthropomorphized animal at the cen-
ter, emerges in the aftermath of existence, but, paradoxically, has an air of being re-
counted and a priori, of already having happened. Existence is neither a priori nor
originary; it is a moment of possibility.
In the spirit of investigating whether we were always storytellers, I went back to a
canonical text. It is from the first millennium BC: the Kena Upanishad. It felt impor-
tant to go back to it because storytelling has been almost dutifully conflated with
non-Western cultures, which themselves are often conflated with orality. Writing
and inscription are, on the other hand, an Enlightenment project. Outside the
West, in the lap of orality, our mothers and grandmothers have been telling us stories
from when we were in the womb. Story, for us, has been an autochthonic method of
nutrition.While not denying any of this, it was important to check out a primary text
from an incorrigibly storytelling culture. ‘Kena’ in the Kena Upanishad means ‘why,’
connected to the whys and wherefores of the universe. This poetic statement is from
the brief opening section of this Upanishad (note that Brahman is not to be confused
with Brahma, Brahmin, or other similar-sounding words):
Who sends the mind to wander afar? Who first drives life to start on its journey? Who impels us
to utter these words? Who is the spirit [‘spirit,’ as the Sanskritist Heeraman Tiwari pointed out to
me, is a Judeo-Christian translation of what he calls, in his translation, an all-pervasive ‘ele-
ment’] behind the eye and the ear? […] What cannot be spoken with words, but that whereby
words are spoken, know that alone to be Brahman.
What cannot be thought with the mind, but that whereby the mind can think, know that alone to
be Brahman the spirit and not what people here adore. What cannot be seen with the eye, but
that whereby the eye can see – know that alone to be Brahman.What cannot be heard with the
ear, but that whereby the ear can hear; what cannot be withdrawn with breath, but that whereby
breath is withdrawn, know that alone to be Brahman. (The Upanishads 1965, 51)
This comes across not so much as a narrative of creation as an instance of self-reflex-
ivity that is at once curiously tortured and liberating. Its meaning cannot be para-
phrased, but it can be rephrased as a series of questions and replies. ‘What cannot
be thought with the mind? Whatever it is that makes the mind think.’ ‘What cannot
be seen with the eye? Whatever it is that makes the eye see.’ It is an account that
abjures progression on behalf of the self-reflexive, of the assertion that turns upon
itself.
Here is an excerpt from the third section:
The Brahman once won a victory for the Devas. Through that victory of the Brahman, the Devas
became elated. They thought, “This victory is ours. This glory is ours.” The Brahman perceived
this and appeared before them. They did not know what mysterious form it was.
They said to Fire: “O Jataveda (All-knowing)! Find out what mysterious spirit this is.” He said:
“Yes.”
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He ran towards it and He (Brahman) said to him: “Who art thou?” “I am Agni, I am Jataveda,” he
(the Fire-god) replied.
Brahman asked: “What power resides in thee?” Agni replied: “I can burn up all whatsoever ex-
ists on earth.”
Brahman placed a straw before him and said: “Burn this.” He (Agni) rushed towards it with all
speed, but was not able to burn it. So he returned from there and said (to the Devas): “I was not
able to find out what this great mystery is.”
Then they said to Vayu (the Air-god): “Vayu! Find out what mystery this is.” He said: “Yes.”
He ran towards it and He (Brahman) said to him: “Who art thou?” “I am Vayu, I am Matarisva
(traveller of Heaven),” he (Vayu) said.
Then the Brahman said: “What power is in thee?” Vayu replied: “I can blow away all whatsoever
exists on earth”
Brahman placed a straw before him and said: “Blow this away.” He (Vayu) rushed towards it
with all speed, but was not able to blow it away. So he returned from there and said (to the
Devas): “I was not able to find out what this great mystery is.” (52–53)
Although similar in shape and tone to Judeo-Christian parables about miraculous
strength, like the one about Samson bringing down the columns, this is really a para-
ble about delicacy. After all, what is at issue here is not moving mountains, but a
straw. You do not need strength to move a straw: what is it that you need, then? Del-
icacy is non-narrative; as with writing a poem, you cannot coerce its workings. Nar-
rative and story by themselves are neither the same thing as, nor a guarantee of,
movement; this is what writers, like the mystified Devas, need to learn quickly. Oth-
erwise the straw stays inert.
I never liked reading novels. My growing up was spent consuming comic books and
poems. I was eventually drawn to novels through exceptional paragraphs cited in es-
says: by my late teens, I was probably more likely to read a piece of criticism about a
work rather than the work itself. One such paragraph occurs in A House for Mr. Bis-
was by V.S. Naipaul, where Biswas in his early life takes a new job as a sign painter
after having been a bus conductor; I encountered it in my early twenties in a critical
piece about the book in an anthology on ‘commonwealth literature’. Biswas must re-
produce the edict, “IDLERS KEEP OUT BY ORDER.”
[H]is hand became surer, his strokes bolder, his feeling for letters finer. He thought R and S the
most beautiful of Roman letters; no letter could express so many moods as R, without losing its
beauty; and what could compare with the swing and rhythm of S? With a brush, large letters
were easier than small […]. (Naipaul 1969, 76)
I was transfixed by this paragraph, and felt it was a shame that I had have to read the
novel. I was content, instead, to reread the paragraph endlessly. This is because the
paragraph presented me with a possibility. The possibility was the novel. The novel I
was presented with was not the telling, the recounting, that I would purportedly have
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to read. That act of reading the narrative, the recounting, would, in a sense, diminish
the possibility generated by this encounter with the paragraph.Where, then, are we
likely to find this moment of possibility in a piece of writing; in, say (since we are
talking about storytelling), a work of narrative fiction? To me it seems it resides in
the sort of standalone paragraph such as the one I have quoted, which belongs to
a story but is also independent of it, in that it seems equally located in an irreducible
life and textuality outside that novel as it is in the life narrated and contained within
it.
The moment of possibility resides especially in the opening paragraphs of a work
of fiction, or any paragraph that has the irresolution, the air of open-endedness and
lifelikeness, the lack of recountedness, that opening paragraphs have. The para-
graphs in the first page of a novel (sometimes in the second and third pages too)
have not been bound yet by the telling, but are opening out on to something. My am-
bition, always, was to write novels composed entirely of opening paragraphs and
then to put them in some kind of order. The order would be a sequence that was part-
ly illusory. Of course, we are experts at creating an illusion of continuity, both as
readers and writers, and I believe that if you give somebody a text without any nar-
rative, they will impose continuity on it. My subterranean aim – so subterranean that
it is taken me two decades to see what I was up to – was to create an assemblage of
opening paragraphs, to expand as much as possible, without introducing a sense of
development, the vivid lack of resolution of the first three or four pages.
What kind of text is produced by an artist who does not want the moment of pos-
sibility to be closed down by the compulsion or the need to tell? Once you commit to
telling, the moment in the opening paragraph is over. We know for a fact that many
writers have wonderful opening pages whose magic is sacrificed to higher causes,
such as observances to do with the syntax of realism, and the responsibility of por-
traying the arc of the existence of certain human beings or ‘characters’: the novelist
“must / Become the whole of boredom itself,” says W.H. Auden, who was in awe of,
and slightly bewildered by, this voluntary taking on of the depiction of social milieu
almost as a form of social responsibility (Auden 1962). This loss of the abandon of the
opening pages is characteristic of the human compromise, the deep maturity, that
the novel represents, when the writer knowingly assents to being shackled by the
need for narrative and telling. Naipaul himself is a fundamental example of a writer
who sometimes begins with astonishing passages of lifelikeness, but then not so
much loses the plot, or loses himself to a plot, but takes on upon himself fetters
that are clearly unwanted. Joan Didion recognizes this and expands on the peculiar
sensory excitement of the first three pages of Naipaul’s Guerrillas, which she confess-
es to compulsively rereading, almost as if the rest of the novel did not really matter
(Als 2006). In the novella In A Free State, Naipaul translates, with extraordinary vi-
tality in the opening section, an intuition of possibility into a story about a European
man and woman who must journey urgently and impulsively out of an African coun-
try in the time of a coup (Naipaul 1971). Then, like his two characters, he seems not to
know what to do except see the journey through. As the syntax of narrative takes
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over, not only does the representation of the journey feel increasingly entrapping, but
– as is often the case with Naipaul when he feels unhappy – by most standards mo-
rally and politically peculiar, turgid, and alienating.
Something similar happens in his travelogue An Area of Darkness (Naipaul 1964).
Towards the beginning, a period of waiting is described: the ship, on its way to India,
has stopped at the port in Alexandria. Nothing happens; horse-drawn cabs are await-
ing fares. Few arrive, and melancholy settles in. This melancholy is a form of excite-
ment, just as the waiting-for-something-to-happen is a kind of energy unmatched by
the events later narrated in the book, the actual encounter with India, which is the
book’s legitimate subject. For Naipaul, as possibility recedes (and possibility, for
him, as the chapter on Alexandria shows, has little do with optimism), questionable
moral judgement begins to dominate: this is his response to the cost of succumbing
to narrative propriety – not so much ‘becoming the whole of boredom itself,’ but an
alienated chafing.
A House for Biswas opens with a short prologue, where everything is indetermi-
nate and proleptic. It begins, “Ten weeks before he died, Mr Mohun Biswas, a jour-
nalist of Sikkim Street, St James, Port of Spain, was sacked,” and then goes on to
dwell, for five pages, on Biswas’s house, a house that is “flawed” and “irretrievably
mortgaged”: “during these months of illness and despair he was struck again and
again by the wonder of being in his own house, the audacity of it” (Naipaul 1969,
7).We are suspended here, in the prologue, with Mr Biswas, between arrival and de-
parture. Naipaul manages to stay throughout with this sense of the possible, and he
does this by constantly returning to Biswas’s disbelieving conviction, even at the end
of the novel, that the house on Sikkim Street is a house he has just begun to live in:
“In the extra space Mr Biswas planted a laburnum tree” (583). In my edition, 583 of
590 pages have gone by when this sentence appears; and yet, despite all that has
ensued and is now finished, we are still absorbing the prologue’s “wonder” and “au-
dacity” (7) of arrival.
Arrival, like existence, and unlike story, lacks the air of the a priori and the nar-
rated. In The Enigma of Arrival, the ship that paused at harbor in An Area of Darkness
appears again, but this time in a de Chirico painting that gives both its title and its
atmosphere of lapsed expectancy to the book. Midway through the novel, the narra-
tor reflects that the painting is about a ship that sailed into a city, and a man who got
off at the port and intended to go back, but forgot to: “The antique ship has gone. The
traveler has lived out his life” (Naipaul 1987, 92). The inadvertent forgetting of the
matter of going back, rather than the creation of a new existence, becomes this per-
son’s story, as it does the narrator’s. Forgetting and possibility become, then, inter-
changeable; the life is never really recounted. It – the novel; the painting – does
not contain the tale of an immigrant; it represents an attempt at immersion in a be-
ginning, what Naipaul calls ‘arrival,’ involving an action endlessly postponed, which
the narrator encapsulates with the words, “The traveler has lived out his life.”
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How do we construct a page composed of opening paragraphs? One is reminded, of
course, of Walter Benjamin’s ambition to write a book composed entirely of quota-
tions. A quotation for him, as in his essays on Franz Kafka, is also a paragraph;
for my younger self, for reasons I mentioned earlier, and maybe for my present
self too, a paragraph is a quotation. A novel is an assemblage of paragraphs or quo-
tations, which both belong to the narrative and outside it. A quotation in an imagi-
native work – say, an essay – causes unsettlement. It is there not as evidence, to le-
gitimize a claim, as it might in a scholarly work, but to remind us that the narrator is
distracted, that they have made an association, and have been momentarily led from
the text to another text outside it. The quote is not wholly present in the narrative; it
is partly elsewhere. So the quote does not just further an argument; it leads to an
opening up. The paragraph, as I understand it, must have the same sense of not
being wholly present that the quotation, in Benjamin’s sense, does.When Benjamin
speaks of his ambition to write a book composed entirely of quotations, he is speak-
ing of a method of building that brings together units that belong, but also do not
wholly belong, to the argument or narrative. A quoted paragraph for him is a stand-
alone paragraph, because it comprises a possibility that makes recounting – that is,
the rest of the narrative – redundant. If the paragraph is at least doubly located in
fiction, then one location lies in fiction’s purported task, the recounting of a life;
the other lies outside it, in acknowledging what is more powerful than ‘story’ –
the present’s contingency.
I have not forgotten that this piece has to do with ‘forgetfulness and storytelling,’ for
which reason I wish to look at the opening section of Kafka’s Metamorphosis in Mi-
chael Hofmann’s translation:
When Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from troubled dreams, he found himself changed into a
monstrous cockroach in his bed. He lay on his tough, armoured back, and, raising his head a
little, managed to see – sectioned off by little crescent-shaped ridges into segments – the ex-
panse of his arched, brown belly, atop which the coverlet perched, forever on the point of slip-
ping off entirely.
“What’s the matter with me?” he thought. It was no dream. There, quietly between the four fa-
miliar walls, was his room, a normal human room, if always a little on the small side. Over the
table, on which an array of cloth samples was spread out – Samsa was a travelling salesman –
hung the picture he had only recently clipped from a magazine, and set in an attractive gilt
frame. It was a picture of a lady in a fur hat and stole, sitting bolt upright, holding in the direc-
tion of the onlooker a heavy muff into which she had thrust the whole of her forearm.
From there, Gregor’s gaze directed itself towards the window, and the drab weather outside –
raindrops could be heard plinking against the tin window ledges – made him quite melancholy.
“What if I went back to sleep for a while, and forgot about all this nonsense?” he thought, but
that proved quite impossible, because he was accustomed to sleeping on his right side, and in
his present state he was unable to find that position. […]
“Oh, my Lord!” he thought. “If only I didn’t have to follow such an exhausting profession! On the
road, day in, day out. The work is so much more strenuous than it would be in the head office,
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and then there’s the additional ordeal of travelling, worries about train connections, the irregu-
lar, bad meals, new people all the time, no continuity, no affection. Devil take it!” He felt a light
itch at the top of his belly […].
He slid back to his previous position. “All this getting up early,” he thought, “is bound to take its
effect. There are some other travelling salesmen I could mention who live like harem women. […]
If I didn’t have to exercise restraint for the sake of my parents, then I would have quit a long time
ago; I would have gone up to the director and told him exactly what I thought of him. He would
have fallen off his desk in surprise! That’s a peculiar way he has of sitting anyway, up on his
desk, and talking down to his staff from on high, making them step up to him very close because
he’s so hard of hearing […].” (Kafka 2007, 75–76)
What is striking is how both Gregor and the narrator have forgotten what the central
predicament and theme are, or are incapable of grasping their centrality. Gregor is
more concerned with the difficulty of turning on his side in his present state, a dif-
ficulty that impedes his plan to sleep a bit longer; he is made melancholy by the
sound of rain; he will soon become aware of the unfairness of train schedules; in
the meantime, he is incensed by the memory of his boss’s posture. Another writer,
a lesser writer, would not have permitted this losing sight, so early on, of the immen-
sity of what has happened. But the liberation of the opening pages of Metamorphosis
comes from their inability to be absolutely present, their vacillation between being in
the story of a man who has become a giant insect and their forgetting of this story
and their leakage into something outside it: the matter of living, with its timetables
and trains, which is supposed to feed its experiences into the story but also competes
with and is unconscious of it.
There is another kind of forgetfulness here: that of objects, or what in literary
works we call ‘detail’. The picture of the woman “sitting bolt upright”; the gilt
frame; the coverlet; the tin window ledges; the rain – these seem not to be fully con-
scious of being part, as background, of a story of a man who finds he is a giant in-
sect. Their role is not even ironical, as, according to Auden, the role of the animals
and humans in Breughel’s painting of Icarus’s fall into the ocean is: “how everything
turns away / Quite leisurely from the disaster” (Auden 2007, 87). In Metamorphosis,
detail is not so much indifferent to the disaster as it to being in a story about a dis-
aster; its location is both in the story and independent of it. So a narrative with an
easily paraphrasable centrality of focus becomes, instead, an example of multiple
and dispersed openings out. Its details have their counterpart not in Breughel’s Ica-
rus, or in realist fiction, or in period or genre cinema, but in Abbas Kiarostami’s mov-
ies,where non-professionals are often not playing characters but themselves, and are
not fully mindful that they are in a larger story. They are in the film and outside it.
The same can be said of animals, air, water, and trees in a Tarkovsky film, or in a film
like The New World by Terence Malick: that all these are non-professional actors un-
aware of playing the role of the characters ‘animal,’ ‘air,’ ‘water,’ and ‘trees’ respec-
tively, but are, inadvertently, themselves. They emanate, if you notice them, an innate
forgetfulness of the story they are in, as do the paragraphs I have mentioned. In this
regard, the details I am discussing are quite unlike those in period or sci-fi films,
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where objects, horses, elephants, and things exude, like the protagonist, an aware-
ness at every point of being either in history or in the future, two easily recognizable
categories that embody further modulations on the recounted air of storytelling.
Jean Paul Sartre was intrigued by the idea of the adventure. An adventure, of course,
is another name for story: for children, ‘adventure story’ is a tautology. Here is Sar-
tre’s narrator in Nausea:
[F]or the most banal event to become an adventure you must (and this is enough) begin to re-
count it. This is what fools people: a man is always a teller of tales, […] he sees everything that
happens to him through them; and he tries to live his own life as if you were telling a story. But
you have to choose: live or tell. (Sartre 1964, 56)
In other words, we do not, cannot, know we are in an adventure or in a story. The
same can be said of history: no one is really aware of living in a historical epoch.
Conversations with people who have participated in historic situations, whether it
is a performance by John Coltrane or the partition of a country, confirm this unknow-
ingness: all they recall is what it was like to be present at that time. But forgetfulness
is absent from historical novels or films, as it is in films about the future; both the
past and future are assembled by bringing together markers of history – turbans,
togas, or forelocks – or the future: spaceships and space. Even space lacks forgetful-
ness in films like 2001: A Space Odyssey, whose story is already, a priori, being nar-
rated as the ‘future.’ Space, in Stanley Kubrick’s film, becomes a metaphor for the
‘homogenous empty time’ of history that Benjamin says makes the idea of man’s
progress possible: the historicism that imbues our notions of the futuristic and his-
torical is enacted succinctly in the film’s opening: an ape from a prehistoric epoch
flings a bone into the air which, ascending in ‘homogenous empty time,’ becomes
a spaceship.
Yet, both Kubrick in Barry Lyndon, and certainly Tarkovsky in historical films like
Andrey Rublov, or in his science fiction-based cinema, Stalker and Solaris, reject the
notion of the ‘adventure.’ The ‘background’ in these movies adheres, on one level, to
what Sartre calls “the most banal event”; for instance, one of the first signals we re-
ceive in Solaris of dissonance does not have to do with science fiction appurtenances,
but a horse wandering outside a block of sixties’ houses; the second signal, which
also comes early, occurs when a tunnel a man is driving through takes inordinately
long to end: the tunnel, a very recognizable urban feature (this bit, set in Russia, was
apparently shot in Japan, testimony to a certain kind of mid-century urbanization
available in various cultures), seems to loop in upon itself without in any other
way being remarkable. The horses, spaceships, horsemen, and stretches of grass
or space in Tarkovsky’s films, and in Barry Lyndon, possess not identifiable charac-
teristics that mark them out as futuristic or historical, but a disorganized banality, a
forgetfulness of the role they’re playing in the setting. As a result, both the past and
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the future are, in these movies, undifferentiated from the non-homogenous present
in which we live.
What is the relation between living and telling on the one hand, and between living
and writing on the other? The prevalent model for life’s relationship to telling is that
we live, gather material, and then pour or transform that material experience of liv-
ing into something that comes out of it: the story we consequently tell.
In my understanding, however, the moment of writing converges with living ran-
domly. There is no decision about transforming into a story material that has been
previously experienced or collected; instead, one arrives at a juncture at which
there is an unexpected sense of possibility for the writer: I include all of us when
I use that word. This sense of possibility comprises what I am calling ‘writing,’
which need not involve putting pen to paper or sitting down to write an inaugural
sentence – as the act is portrayed in Hollywood films, where the ‘writer’ might be
a fictional character or Hemingway or Fitzgerald, poised significantly at the typewrit-
er to start a novel. The physical act of writing, or making that break from life when
one sits down to commit oneself to embarking on a work is a reification, a reduction
of the actual intimation of a beginning, a possibility that writing actually continually
constitutes.
Let me give you an example of what I mean. You are looking at the cover of a
book and want to own it, to buy it. You study the cover, transfixed by it, and then
you do not read the book. You are transfixed not only because you want to read
what is contained within, but because you have begun in a sense to compose or
write what is within. The story that is given to you by the book has become secondary
to the story you have begun to write. This is the moment of writing. But you have not
written anything; you are arrested by what you see on the cover. You buy the book; in
fact, you buy many such books, transfixed by them for one reason or another – it
could be the jacket or title; it could be your reading, in the bookshop, of the first
page – and then you put them on the shelf, as a covert gesture towards the perpetual
imminence, the possibility, of writing. Your sense of ownership has to do with own-
ing the story, but the story is not to be reduced by recounting, by telling: the story is
always to be a possibility, which is why the books on our bookshelves that we do not
read outnumber the books that we do. Our bookshelves are largely made up of books
that we do not read. These are our ongoing moments of writing – a self-generated
accumulation of writing as possibility.
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